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nick committed 2026-07-15 21:24:42 -07:00
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# OpenVPN PKI — offline CA workflow
# OpenVPN PKI — offline CA workflow (server cert only)
There are **no individual client certificates** in this design — users
authenticate with AD password + Duo. The PKI exists solely so clients can
verify they're talking to the real server (`remote-cert-tls server`), and
`ta.key` (tls-crypt) gates who can attempt a handshake at all.
The CA private key **never touches the VPS**. Run easy-rsa on an offline
machine (or at minimum a machine that isn't this server), then copy only the
issued material here.
machine, then copy only the issued material here.
## One-time CA + server cert (on the offline machine)
## One-time setup (on the offline machine)
```bash
git clone https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa.git && cd easy-rsa/easyrsa3
@@ -12,39 +16,34 @@ git clone https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa.git && cd easy-rsa/easyrsa3
./easyrsa build-ca # sets the CA passphrase — keep offline
./easyrsa build-server-full racknerd-vpn nopass
openvpn --genkey tls-crypt ta.key # shared tls-crypt key
./easyrsa gen-crl
```
## Copy to the VPS (this directory)
| File on offline box | Name here |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|
| `pki/ca.crt` | `ca.crt` |
| `pki/issued/racknerd-vpn.crt` | `server.crt` |
| `pki/private/racknerd-vpn.key` | `server.key` |
| `ta.key` | `ta.key` |
| `pki/crl.pem` (optional, see server.conf) | `crl.pem` |
| File on offline box | Name here |
|--------------------------------|--------------|
| `pki/ca.crt` | `ca.crt` |
| `pki/issued/racknerd-vpn.crt` | `server.crt` |
| `pki/private/racknerd-vpn.key` | `server.key` |
| `ta.key` | `ta.key` |
`chmod 600 server.key ta.key` after copying.
## Per-user client certs (offline)
## Client profile
```bash
./easyrsa build-client-full nick nopass
```
Build ONE `.ovpn` from `client/client.ovpn.template`, pasting `ca.crt` and
`ta.key` into the inline blocks. The same profile goes to every user.
Build the client's `.ovpn` from `client/client.ovpn.template`, pasting
`ca.crt`, the client cert/key, and `ta.key` into the inline blocks.
CN should match the AD username — the server logs use it
(`username-as-common-name` keeps them consistent).
## Revoking access
## Revoking a client
No client certs means no CRL — access control lives where the identity
lives:
```bash
./easyrsa revoke nick && ./easyrsa gen-crl
```
Copy the fresh `crl.pem` here, uncomment `crl-verify` in `server.conf`, and
`docker compose restart openvpn`.
- **Disable the AD account** (or remove it from the VPN group if you use
`security_group_dn`) — kills new logins immediately.
- Remove/disable the user in **Duo** as backup.
- If a *profile* leaks (ta.key compromised): regenerate `ta.key`, replace
it here, restart openvpn, redistribute the profile — old profiles stop
working instantly.
Everything in this directory except this README is gitignored.
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# OpenVPN road-warrior endpoint — RackNerd hub
# Auth chain: client cert (offline CA) + user/pass -> PAM -> RADIUS
# Auth chain: AD user/pass -> PAM -> RADIUS
# -> Duo Auth Proxy (127.0.0.1:1812) -> LDAPS to the DCs.
# No individual client certs: identity is LDAP + Duo only. tls-crypt
# (shared key in the profile) still gates who can attempt a handshake.
port 1194
proto udp4
@@ -25,23 +27,21 @@ push "dhcp-option DOMAIN-SEARCH ad.oswaldtheotter.net"
push "dhcp-option DOMAIN-SEARCH ad.trochalakis.net"
push "block-outside-dns"
# PKI — issued from the offline CA, see pki/README.md
# PKI — server certificate only (offline CA, see pki/README.md);
# clients present no certificate.
ca /etc/openvpn/pki/ca.crt
cert /etc/openvpn/pki/server.crt
key /etc/openvpn/pki/server.key
dh none
tls-crypt /etc/openvpn/pki/ta.key
# Enable once you publish a CRL from the offline CA (revoked laptops etc.):
;crl-verify /etc/openvpn/pki/crl.pem
remote-cert-tls client
tls-version-min 1.2
data-ciphers AES-256-GCM:CHACHA20-POLY1305
auth SHA256
# User auth via Duo (password only = push; "password,123456" = passcode)
plugin /usr/lib/openvpn/openvpn-plugin-auth-pam.so openvpn
verify-client-cert require
verify-client-cert none
username-as-common-name
hand-window 120 # allow time for the Duo push round-trip
reneg-sec 0 # no mid-session TLS renegotiation (would re-prompt Duo)