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2026-07-15 21:24:42 -07:00

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# OpenVPN PKI — offline CA workflow (server cert only)
There are **no individual client certificates** in this design — users
authenticate with AD password + Duo. The PKI exists solely so clients can
verify they're talking to the real server (`remote-cert-tls server`), and
`ta.key` (tls-crypt) gates who can attempt a handshake at all.
The CA private key **never touches the VPS**. Run easy-rsa on an offline
machine, then copy only the issued material here.
## One-time setup (on the offline machine)
```bash
git clone https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa.git && cd easy-rsa/easyrsa3
./easyrsa init-pki
./easyrsa build-ca # sets the CA passphrase — keep offline
./easyrsa build-server-full racknerd-vpn nopass
openvpn --genkey tls-crypt ta.key # shared tls-crypt key
```
## Copy to the VPS (this directory)
| File on offline box | Name here |
|--------------------------------|--------------|
| `pki/ca.crt` | `ca.crt` |
| `pki/issued/racknerd-vpn.crt` | `server.crt` |
| `pki/private/racknerd-vpn.key` | `server.key` |
| `ta.key` | `ta.key` |
`chmod 600 server.key ta.key` after copying.
## Client profile
Build ONE `.ovpn` from `client/client.ovpn.template`, pasting `ca.crt` and
`ta.key` into the inline blocks. The same profile goes to every user.
## Revoking access
No client certs means no CRL — access control lives where the identity
lives:
- **Disable the AD account** (or remove it from the VPN group if you use
`security_group_dn`) — kills new logins immediately.
- Remove/disable the user in **Duo** as backup.
- If a *profile* leaks (ta.key compromised): regenerate `ta.key`, replace
it here, restart openvpn, redistribute the profile — old profiles stop
working instantly.
Everything in this directory except this README is gitignored.